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COMPARED TO WHAT? MENSTRUATION,
PREGNANCY, AND THE COMPLEXITIES OF
COMPARISON
EMILY GOLD WALDMAN*
INTRODUCTION
When crafting a sex discrimination argument, finding the right comparison can be
crucial. Indeed, comparison-drawing has been a key strategy for advocates challenging
the constitutionality of the tampon tax. In their 2016 lawsuit challenging New York's
tampon tax, the plaintiffs alleged that the New York State Department of Taxation and
Finance had imposed a "double standard"when deciding which products would be
considered tax-free medical items and which would not.' Their complaint stated:
Medical products exclusively for women are taxed. Medical products
also used by men are not. For example, the Department considers
Rogaine, foot powder, dandruff shampoo, chapstick, facial wash, adult
diapers, and incontinence pads to be medical items. These products are

not taxed. But medical items used only by women-tampons and
sanitary pads-are taxed. 2
The comparison argument had powerful rhetorical force-and popular appeal. Within
several months after the complaint was filed, New York repealed its tampon tax. 3 Shortly
thereafter, plaintiffs in Florida filed a parallel lawsuit, emphasizing that in deciding which
* Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty Development & Operations, Elisabeth Haub School of
Law at Pace University.

1 Compl.

¶ 2, Seibert v. N.Y. State Dep't of Tax'n & Fin., No. 904075-16 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. March 3, 2016).

2 Id ¶¶2-4.
3 The New York State Legislature voted to repeal the tax on May 25, 2016. See New York Legislature Cuts
Taxes on Feminine Hygiene Products, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/26/nyregion/new-york-legislature-cuts-taxes-on-feminine-hygieneproducts.html [https://perma.cc/QSH8-6DPQ]. Governor Andrew Cuomo signed the measure on July 21,
2016. See Governor Cuomo Signs Legislation to Exempt Sales and Use Taxes on Feminine Hygiene
Products, GOVERNOR ANDREW M. CUOMO (July 21, 2016), https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor[https://perma.cc/GK8Acuomo-signs-legislation-exempt-sales-and-use-taxes-feminine-hygiene-products

GKGV].
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products would meet the statutory definition of "common household remedies," the
Florida Department of Revenue had "excluded tampons and pads from the list of
nontaxable medical items," while including "adhesive tape, epsom salts, athlete's foot
treatment, minoxidil for hair regrowth (i.e., Rogaine), and petroleum jelly" as well as
"band-aids, bandages, and gauze." 4 Within a year, Florida had repealed its tampon tax as
well.5
The website of "Tax Free. Period"-the "legal, advocacy and public engagement
campaign founded by Period Equity and LOLA [a menstrual product company] to end
the tampon tax in the U.S."-also emphasizes the comparison theme.6 Its homepage
features an interactive United States map that allows the visitor to click on different states
and see which items are tax-exempt in the states that are still taxing tampons and pads.
Clicking on Texas, for instance, reveals that "Texas has a tax on tampons, but dandruff
shampoo is untaxed." Clicking on many of the other states reveals some arresting
comparisons: "Georgia has a tax on tampons, but tattoos are untaxed," "New Mexico has
a tax on tampons, but souvenirs at minor league baseball stadiums are untaxed," "Iowa
has a tax on tampons, but cotton candy is untaxed," and so on.7 "Bingo supplies?
Doughnuts? Seriously?" reads the map's caption.8
The comparison lens is not unique to the tampon tax. The Pregnancy Discrimination
Act (PDA), which amended Title VII to state that the prohibition on discrimination
"because of sex" included discrimination "on the basis of pregnancy," 9 frames one of its
core protections in comparative terms. It provides that "women affected by pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employmentrelated purposes ... as other persons not so affected but similarin their ability or

4

Compl. ¶¶ 39-41, Wendell v. Fla. Dep't of Revenue, No. 2016CA1526 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 6, 2016).

5 See, e.g., Amy Hollyfield, FloridaJoins Other States in Ending Tampon Tax, TAMPA BAY TIMEs (May 25,
2017), https://www.tampabay.com/florida-joins-other-states-in-ending-tampon-tax/2325147/

[https://perma.cc/HZ6A-BBVS].
6 PERIOD EQUiTY, http://www.taxfreeperiod.com [https://perma.cc/K9EX-FRZJ].
7

Id

9 Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified as amended at 42

U.S.C. § 2000e(k)).
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inability to work." 1 0 The PDA itself was passed in response to two prior Supreme Court
comparison-drawing cases in the pregnancy context: Geduldig v. Aiello" (which arose

under the Equal Protection Clause) and GeneralElectric v. Gilbert" (which arose under
Title VII). In those cases, the Supreme Court held that treating pregnancy less favorably
than other medical conditions did not necessarily amount to sex discrimination, because
the relevant comparison was not between men and women, but rather between "pregnant
women" and "nonpregnant persons."' 3 The PDA rejected that reasoning, shifting the
comparative frame (at least in the Title VII context) from pregnant women versus
nonpregnant persons to pregnant employees versus non-pregnant employees. But it
retained the underlying comparative approach. To win pregnancy accommodation claims
under the PDA, it is not enough for plaintiffs to show that their pregnancy-related needs
were not accommodated; they must also show that analogous requests by equally-limited
non-pregnant employees were granted.' 4
This piece explores the complexities of the comparative model as applied to sex
discrimination claims that are connected to female biology. On the one hand,
comparisons can be a useful and precise way to pinpoint discrimination. The notion that
bandages and adult diapers are tax-exempt, while tampons and pads are not, brings the
unfairness of the tampon tax into sharp relief: Why are those products for absorbing
bodily fluids tax-free, when menstrual products are not? The same is true for a pregnant
employee who can show that her request for a light-duty accommodation was denied
while the identical light-duty request by another similarly-situated, non-pregnant
employee was granted.
But the model also contains two traps. First, almost no comparison is perfect. There
is often some potential for distinguishing and line-drawing, some way to argue that the
comparison does not fully hold up. Second, the comparative model is itself inherently
limiting. The biological processes of menstruation and pregnancy (along with menopause

10

Id

" 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
12

429 U.S. 125 (1976).

13 Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496-97 n.20; Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 136-39.
The Pregnant Workers Fairness Act (PWFA) would change this regime by creating a free-standing
accommodation right for pregnant employees, giving them far greater protection. At the time this Article
went to press, the PWFA had passed in the House of Representatives (on May 14, 2021) and was pending in
the Senate.
14
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and breastfeeding, which this piece does not address) are closely intertwined with female
sex and have no obvious analogues. Indeed, these processes impose specific challenges
and needs that are not borne equally across the sexes. Yet the comparative model
reductively suggests that if no products receive tax-exempt status, or if no employees
receive accommodations for their inability to work, there is no sex discrimination issue at
all. Although advocates cannot escape the current comparative framework within which
they must work-and indeed should use it to their advantage when possible-we should
all remain mindful of the framework's ultimate limitations.
The piece begins by analyzing Young v. UnitedParcelService, Inc., 5 the 2015
Supreme Court case that grappled with how to apply the PDA's comparison-based
standard. I discuss how Young illustrates the complexities of comparison and unpack the
compromise approach that emerged. I then consider the potential usefulness of the. Young
approach to the tampon tax cases, while acknowledging that they arise under the Equal
Protection Clause rather than Title VII. I conclude with some broader reflections.

I.

Young and the "Most-Favored-Nation" Question

Peggy Young was a part-time UPS driver who became pregnant after suffering
several miscarriages. 1 6 Her doctor advised her not to lift more than twenty pounds during
the first twenty weeks of her pregnancy, or more than ten pounds after that point." But
her job required her to lift up to seventy pounds (and up to 150 pounds with assistance).1 8
UPS denied Young's request for a "light-duty" accommodation, instead telling her that
she could not work while under a lifting restriction.1 9 Young therefore had to stay home
without pay during most of her pregnancy, losing her salary and health insurance.2 0
Young's subsequent PDA lawsuit raised a statutory interpretation puzzle. The PDA,
as noted above, states that "[w]omen affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes ... as other

15

575 U.S. 206 (2015).

161d at211.

19

Id
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persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work." Here, UPS's
policy was to grant accommodations to three categories of employees: (1) drivers who
had become disabled on the job, (2) those who had lost their Department of
Transportation (DOT) certifications, and (3) those who suffered from a disability covered
by the Americans with Disabilities Act.2 ' UPS argued that it had not violated the PDA
because it was not accommodating any employees similar to Young.2 2 Rather, UPS was
accommodating only those employees who fell into the above three categories, and was
treating Young "just as it had treated all 'other' relevant 'persons" outside of those
categories, pregnant or not.23 Young, in turn, argued that once an employer was
accommodating any subset of workers with disabling conditions, "pregnant workers who
are similar in the ability to work [must] receive the same treatment even if still other
nonpregnant workers do not receive accommodations." 24
The Supreme Court characterized Young as asserting that pregnancy confers a
"'most-favored-nation' status," summarizing her argument as follows:
As long as an employer provides one or two workers with an
accommodation-say, those with particularly hazardous jobs, or those
whose workplace presence is particularly needed, or those who have
worked at the company for many years, or those who are over the age of
55-then it must provide similar accommodations to all pregnant
workers (with comparable physical limitations), irrespective of the nature
of their jobs, the employer's need to keep them working, their ages, or
any other criteria. 5
This argument proved too much, the Court concluded: "We doubt Congress intended to
grant pregnant workers unconditional most-favored-nation status." 26

21 Id.
22

I.

23 Id.
24

Id. at 221.

2

Id.

26 Id. at 222.
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On the other hand, the Court recognized that giving an employer free rein to create
categories that excluded pregnancy threatened to undermine the very purpose of the
PDA. 27 After all, the PDA was passed to overturn Gilbert, which had held that employers
28
did not violate Title VII by treating pregnancy worse than illnesses and accidents.
UPS's argument would essentially reinstate that regime.
The Young Court thus adopted a compromise approach that tracked the three steps of
the familiar McDonnell Douglas framework for analyzing employment discrimination
claims. 29 First, a PDA plaintiff could establish aprimafacie case of pregnancy
discrimination by showing that she sought an accommodation, that no accommodation
was provided, and that the employer did accommodate other employees "similar in their
ability or inability to work." 3 0 Second, the employer could then respond by articulating a
3
"legitimate, nondiscriminatory" reason for denying the accommodation. 1 The Court
cautioned, however, that this reason could not simply be that "it is more expensive or less
32
convenient to add pregnant women to the category" of accommodated employees.
Finally, at step three, the plaintiff could reach a jury by "providing sufficient evidence
that the employer's policies impose a significant burden on pregnant workers, and that
the employer's 'legitimate, nondiscriminatory' reasons are not sufficiently strong to
justify the burden."3 3 The Court further explained that one way a plaintiff could
demonstrate that the policy imposes a significant burden on pregnant workers was by
providing evidence that the employer's policy "accommodates a large percentage of
nonpregnant workers while failing to accommodate a large percentage of pregnant

27

Id. at 226-27.

28

Id. at 227.

29

Id. at 228-29 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)).

30

Id. at 229.

31

Id.
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workers." 34 The Court remanded the case for further consideration under this new
standard.3 5

IL Applying Young to the Tampon Tax Litigation
What does Young tell us about the types of comparisons that might work best in the
tampon tax litigation? In one sense, nothing. After all, Young arose under Title VII (as
amended by the PDA), while the tampon tax cases arise under the Equal Protection
Clause. And although the PDA explicitly overturned Gilbert's interpretation of Title VII,
Geduldig's Equal Protection interpretation has never been explicitly reversed. Thus, a

strong reading of Geduldig might say that it shows that even directly on-point
comparisons are irrelevant to tampon tax claims. If treating pregnant employees less
favorably than other employees does not amount to sex-based discrimination, as
Geduldig suggested, why would treating menstrual products less favorably than other
products be any more problematic? Indeed, even if a plaintiff could show that every
single other personal care product is tax-free besides menstrual products, who cares? Just
as Geduldig held that it did not violate Equal Protection to treat "pregnant women" worse
than "nonpregnant persons," maybe it does not violate Equal Protection to tax menstrual
products and not tax non-menstrual products.
But there are reasons to push back against that very aggressive reading. First,
Geduldig's basic underpinnings have become legally anachronistic. The case was decided
in 1974, before a majority of the Supreme Court held in Craigv. Boren36 that sex-based

discrimination by the government should trigger intermediate scrutiny. (Gilbert, which
was based on Geduldig, also preceded Craig, albeit by weeks.37) In recent years, the
Supreme Court has moved even further away from the formalistic approach underlying
Geduldig's odd distinction between "pregnant women" and "nonpregnant persons,"
becoming quicker to recognize the sex discrimination implications of how pregnancy gets

34

Id at 229-30.

3 Id. at 232. Justice Alito concurred in the result, although he framed the relevant comparison differently. Id.
at 235-41 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). Thus, six justices ultimately agreed that Young's
comparative argument provided the basis of a viable PDA claim.
36

429 U.S. 190 (1976).

37 Gilbert was released on December 7, 1976; Craig came out on December 20, 1976.
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treated. 38 Moreover, Geduldig itself did not hold that all pregnancy-related
classifications-let alone all other classifications related to female biology-could never
be viewed as sex-based classifications. Rather, the Geduldig decision simply ruled that
39
not "every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-based classification."
Thus, it left the door somewhat ajar for how other legislative classifications concerning
pregnancy might be treated.
In some ways, classifications concerning menstruation present an even stronger case
for being viewed as a form of sex discrimination. Geduldig distinguished between
"pregnant women" and "nonpregnant persons," and-without endorsing Geduldig's
reasoning-it is at least true that most women spend the vast majority of their lives as
"nonpregnant persons." Menstruation, by contrast, is a regular occurrence throughout
most women's lives for an average of four decades. Of course, menstruation is not a daily
occurrence, but it is regular enough that those who menstruate must consistently plan
ahead to ensure they have procured the products they need. The tampon tax is thus
relevant during a significant portion of the lifetimes of those who menstruate.
Assuming, then, that Geduldig does not entirely foreclose tampon tax claims, we still
must sort through which comparisons work and which do not. If a state exempts
bandages and' gauze pads but not menstrual products from taxation, does that create a
stronger constitutional case than a state that exempts only prescription drugs? Where do
exemptions for non-necessities, like tattoos, fit in? Here is where Young may be useful.
Its approach-while not technically binding here-is adaptable to this context, at least for
courts who are open to doing so.
As an initial matter, it must be acknowledged that Young rejected a "most-favorednation" approach-which makes it a hard sell here, too. That a state gives a tax
exemption to one product is probably not enough to mean that it must exempt menstrual
products as well. Of course, there are strong policy reasons for exempting menstrual
products from taxation, regardless of which other exemptions exist. But the legal
argument is tougher.
When a state is providing tax exemptions to a sizable number of other products,
though, the case becomes stronger-and Young provides a road map. Borrowing from
Young, the first step would be for a plaintiff to show that menstrual hygiene products are
3 See, e.g., Neil S. Siegel & Reva B. Siegel, PregnancyandSex Role Stereotyping: From Struck to Carhart,
70 OHIO ST. L. J. 1095, 1106 (2009); see supra text accompanying note 13.
39 Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 n.20 (1974) (emphasis added).

226

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF GENDER AND LAW

41

being taxed by the state while other "similar" products are not. Young did not prescribe
exactly which employees count as "similar," and plaintiffs should likewise have some
room here. For example, other products might be similar to menstrual products because
they have a similar function (e.g., other blood-absorbent products), play a similar role
(e.g., other "necessary" personal care products like anti-perspirant), or are used in
connection with similar areas of the body (e.g., condoms or hemorrhoid remedies). The
arguments will likely vary from state to state. A state would then need to respond at step
two by articulating a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory" reason for exempting other similar
products and not menstrual hygiene products. And, as Young puts it, that reason could not
simply be that "it is more expensive or less convenient to add [menstrual hygiene
products] to the [tax-exempt] category."40
Finally, at step three, the plaintiff could respond by "providing sufficient evidence
that the [state's] policies impose a significant burden," and that the [state's] "'legitimate,
nondiscriminatory' reasons are not sufficiently strong to justify the burden." 41 Moreover,
per Young, the plaintiff could prove that there was a significant burden by showing that
the [state's] policy ended up "[exempting] a large percentage of [similar products] while
failing to [exempt menstrual products]." 4 2
Young's reasoning thus indicates the wisdom of advocates' comparison-based
strategy for challenging the tampon tax. Moreover, Young provides a road map for courts
to analyze such claims. While Young's approach certainly is not binding, the Supreme
Court's adoption of it for pregnancy accommodation claims counsels toward adapting it
to other sex discrimination claims that are similarly intertwined with female biology.

CONCLUSION
In advocating for Young's migration to the tampon tax context, I note that Young also
comes with costs. Young not only rejects the "most-favored-nation" idea, but also
suggests that finding a similar analogue is the only way to prevail. This notion that
similar comparators are required fits uneasily with claims that stem from biological
differences. The processes connected with the female reproductive cycle-menstruation,
menopause, pregnancy, and breastfeeding-do not have perfect comparators. Young at
least suggests that "similar," rather than perfect, comparators are good enough, which is
40

Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 575 U.S. 206, 229 (2015).

41

Id.

41
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encouraging. Even finding a similar comparator, however, can sometimes be impossible.
That is troubling, since regardless of whether there is a similar comparator, these
biological processes are imposing real costs and needs-unequally borne across the
sexes-that require consideration and accommodation in order to achieve true social
equality. Young is thus a helpful starting point, but it also indicates the need for a
continued multi-pronged menstrual equity strategy that includes public policy advocacy
as well as litigation.

